problems associated with post-combat transitions originate from a failure to apply some basic concepts concerning transitions. As Richard Beckhard and Reuben Harris from the Alfred Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology point out in their book,
Organizational Transitions: Managing Complex Change,
The traditional approach to change would be to define a plan detailing how people and departments will behave and be organized when the change is complete. What is often not adequately recognized is that such a change will involve a significant period of time -a period that is significantly different from the prechange state (present) and the postchange state (future)…The transition period is a dynamic yet unique state of affairs, one that requires significant management attention and planning. 6 This study explores this "dynamic yet unique state of affairs" by developing a conceptual model for transitions based on the work of Beckhard and Harris, then applying this model in two historical case studies. The result is not only an improved theoretical approach to transitions, but also a greater understanding of some of the practical aspects of planning and executing transitions.
This study offers a framework to analyze transitions, and shows that the problems associated with post-combat transitions, while certainly difficult, are possible to overcome. It shows that despite the unique circumstances surrounding each transition in a campaign, all successful transitions follow some general ideas that contribute to the effectiveness of the transition. It clearly shows that organizations must not consider transitions in isolation since the problems associated with the actual transition period are often the result of the interaction of various factors surrounding the transition period. Finally, it reinforces the idea that effective 5 Frederick Kagan, War and Aftermath, in Policy Review, Internet, http://www.policyreview.org/aug03/kagan_print.html, last accessed September 9, 2003. 6 Richard Beckhard and Reuben Harris, Organizational Transitions: Managing Complex Change, 5. Richard Beckhard served as an Adjunct Professor of Organization Behavior at the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management at MIT. He also served as the executive director of his own consulting firm. Dr. Reuben Harris served as an assistant professor in the Organization Studies Department at MIT. This book is one of several in the Addison-Wesley series relating to the field of Organizational Development. Organization Development (OD) is a soft-systems approach to organizations, and is explained in more detail in Chapter 2. transitions are important for success, and that they are a unique state that need "significant management attention and planning."
Effective operational transitions are crucial for success due to their relationship with tempo, momentum, and initiative. Initiative, or the ability to set or dictate the terms of action, is fundamental for successful operations according to Army doctrine. 7 However, simply seizing the initiative is not enough. An adaptive adversary will quickly negate any temporary advantages gained by seizing the initiative that are not exploited, so units must find a way to retain the initiative. One way to retain the initiative is to operate at a tempo, or pace of operations, that overwhelms the enemy's ability to make decisions and react. Transitions are a vital component in this equation since units that rapidly and effectively transition from one operation to another build an overwhelming momentum that prevents the enemy from seizing the initiative for his own use.
While Army doctrine couches the discussion concerning initiative primarily in terms of combat operations at the tactical and operational levels, this idea applies in other ways as well.
From a campaign perspective, the ability to rapidly and effectively transition between phases in a campaign is crucial to seizing and retaining the initiative throughout the duration of a campaign.
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This includes the transition from pre-combat to combat operations as well as the transition from combat to post-combat operations. Since national objectives are often accomplished during the post-combat phase, it is imperative that planners focus sufficient attention on this critical transition. This is particularly important in the current post-Cold War environment where decision makers can rarely justify the use of force only in terms of national interest. 9 Since the 7 FM 3-0, 4 -15. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . See also Joint Publication 3-0, Chapter 3, page 18. See also JP 5-00.1, Chapter 2, page 16. Current joint and Army doctrine recognizes that U.S. forces can rarely defeat an enemy in a single battle or operation, so planners and commanders develop phases to help "visualize and think through the entire operation." Phases provide a conceptual tool to help synchronize subordinates, ensure unity of effort, and provide flexibility for commanders. They may occur sequentially or simultaneously, and generally integrate and synchronize a group of related operations into more manageable parts to help identify requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. 9 The Bush Administration stated that one o f the reasons for U.S. intervention in Iraq included freeing the Iraqi people "to determine for themselves the future of their country." Taken from "Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People," Internet, national leadership often must justify the use of force in terms of other normative principles such as the spread of democracy, the post-combat phase is crucial in maintaining domestic and international support. 10 Since this support provides freedom of action and facilitates accomplishing national objectives, military planners cannot disregard this transition despite the obvious temptation to ignore it since it occurs after combat operations.
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Any attempt to understand why the Army has difficulty transitioning to post-combat operations despite their obvious importance leads to additional, more in-depth, questions. The answers to these questions not only facilitate understanding operational level transitions, but also provide a logical framework for the remainder of the study. Additionally, they reveal that the
Army's problems with transitioning to post-combat operations result from a failure to apply a few key concepts concerning transitions.
The first series of questions address the conceptual approach to transitions. What First, in addition to countering a threat to an identifiable interest, the use of force will also have to foster some larger normative purpose. Two, the state or entity against which military force is directed must have both lost credibility and be seen as acting outside the bounds of acceptable international behavior. Three, the use of force should conform with the principles of proportionality and discrimination. Finally, following military actions, the US should have a follow on policy that contributes to a positive consolidation of the situation. 10 Post-combat international support is often in the form of donors, peacekeepers, etc. 11 FM 3-0, 4 -16 states, "Retaining the initiative requires planning beyond the initial operation and anticipating possible events. The higher the echelon…the further in advance the staff must plan." [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . FM 3-0 states, "the transition betwe en operations may be the most difficult followon operation to accomplish," (the others being reconstitution and conflict termination). However, it offers very little insight into how to plan or mitigate the risks associated with transitions except to state that commanders need to "anticipate and plan for them as part of any future operation." Despite these shortcomings, this is an improvement from previous doctrine since earlier versions of FM 101-5, the immediate predecessor to FM 3-0, did not address transitions or post-conflict operations at all. to provide specific enough guidance to help determine why some transitions are more successful than other transitions.
Without a commonly accepted framework to examine all transitions, many analysts approach the transition to post-conflict operations as a unique event in a conflict. Depending on their particular view, they attribute poor transitions to errors in planning, flawed doctrine, deficient training, lack of interagency coordination, or misguided military culture.
13 While these conclusions are certainly valid and contribute to understanding transitions, they are limited in some degree by the view that the post-combat transition is unique. Many times, analysts fail to explore the conceptual underpinning regarding transitions or provide a way to link all transitions together. As a result, important insights, and other potential solutions, are lost.
The robust nature of systems thinking, however, provides an analytical framework for understanding and evaluating all transitions regardless of when they occur in a campaign. 14 In some cases, the particular conclusions might be similar for both approaches, but the method of analysis used in reaching those conclusions is dramatically different. Consequently, the systems approach to transitions offers a more comprehensive solution. As an example, instead of concluding that the difficulties surrounding the post-combat transition result directly from the weaknesses of a specific post-combat plan, this monograph reinforces the idea role that focuses on the linkages between the combat and post-combat plans. It explores the relationship between the plans as well as the actual transition of command and control organizations and forces. In other words, it looks at how organizations transition from one state to another using a systems methodology.
13 Dr. John Fishel's work, The Fog of Peace:Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama , is just one example. He offers excellent conclusions, but does not offer any general framework for transitions. His primary conclusions concerning the problems associated with the post-combat transition in Operation JUST CAUSE include the need to effectively articulate political-military strategic objectives in terms of a clear end-state, the need for inter-agency integration in the planning effort, and the need to provide adequate resources in terms of money at the immediate conclusion of hostilities.
14 For the purposes of this paper, "systems thinking," "systems approach," and "systems theory" are interchangeable and imply any methodology that uses the concept of systems to explain a phenomenon.
Using the ideas of Beckhard and Harris as a guide, the organizational development approach discussed later establishes an analytical framework that logically connects the prechange state and the post-change state. It does this by viewing the transition process as four interrelated elements consisting of understanding the pre-change or present state, clarifying the desired post-change or future state, understanding the conditions relating to the transition, and the transition plan. Since transitions are complex and rarely fall into simple and neatly organized categories, establishing criteria that sort different transitions into categories of "good" or "bad" is not very effective. Consequently, the criteria for these case studies focus on clarifying and understanding the four parts of Beckhard and Harris's transition framework. As an example, the question, "Were the conditions for the transition explicitly identified?" helps clarify the second element, "understanding the conditions related to the transition," and offers a method to examine and compare the case studies.
With the framework and corresponding criteria established, discussion turns to the second set of questions concerning transitions. Specifically, what does the Army do in successful transitions during combat operations that it fails to do in post-combat transitions? In order to gain a good appreciation of the similarities and differences between various transitions and compare the theoretical model to reality, this study discusses two historical case studies -one that highlights a transition between two combat phases, and another that highlights a transition to the post-combat phase. The first case study, which illustrates a transition between combat phases, focuses on the transition from the air war that began on 17 January 1991 to the ground war that began on 24 February in Operation DESERT STORM. The second case study, on the other hand, focuses on the transition from combat operations to post-combat operations in Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY.
There is a substantial body of knowledge, both historical and analytical, concerning these interventions. Both revealed strengths and weaknesses in US military doctrine and equipment, and sparked considerable discussions about topics such as the role of airpower, strategic deployability, and post-conflict planning, but the discussion for this study focuses on answering 15 FM 3-0, 6 -20. A passage of lines between two units is a transition at the tactical level. Moving from peace to war is an example of a transition at the strategic level. Joint Publication 1-02 defines the "operational level of war" as "the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy…These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics…and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives."
16 These scarce resources include everything from actual forces and supplies to the energy and attention of a commander and his staff. JP 5-00.1 states in Chapter 2, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, "The challenge for planners, then, is to reconcile the reality of time-oriented deployment of forces and sustainment with the event-driven phasing of operations." Through these case studies, the reader gains an understanding of some of the practical aspects of operational level transitions as well as an appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses of the conceptual model. Using the ideas from above to focus the discussion, attention now turns to developing the conceptual model and criteria.
CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPING THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL
References to "systems thinking" are common today -particularly in business and leadership books like Peter Senge's The Fifth Discipline. 17 However, many of these works do not address the intellectual foundation of their work or its relationship to other fields of the systems movement. Unlike some of these works, this chapter establishes the validity of using a systemsbased model for transitions by discussing the origins and evolution of the systems movement. It concludes with a set of criteria developed using this approach to assist in analyzing transitions in later chapters.
THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE SYSTEMS MOVEMENT
The way in which people solve problems and learn about the world evolve over time, and this explains why the systems view is a relatively new, and needed, approach to problem solving.
For centuries, researchers very ably analyzed phenomena by using the analytic approach developed by men such as Descartes. 18 In the analytic approach, researchers divide the phenomena into smaller, more "manageable," components, develop an understanding of these components, and then reassemble the components back into the original form to understand the whole. 19 This approach involves two fundamental assumptions: first, dividing the phenomenon into components does not distort the phenomenon, and second, the component characteristics are essentially the same whether examined individually or as part of the whole. 20 In other words, the interaction between the components is trivial, and the whole is essentially a sum of the parts. As a 17 Peter Senge's The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of a Learning Organization provides a systems-based approach to leading organiations. Dr. Senge is the Director of the Center for Organizational Learning at MIT's Sloan School of Management. He contends in his book that businesses and organizations must master five disciplines to be successful -one of which is systems thinking.
18 Dr. Peter Checkland, "Science and the Systems Movement" in Systems Behavior, 26. Dr. Checkland is currently a Professor of Systems at the Lancaster University Management School in England and a pioneer in "soft-systems" (ill-structured problems that are difficult to define and quantify). This article provides an excellent account of the origins of the systems movement.
19 Often referred to as Reductionism. As Dr. Checkland mentions, reductionism is part of a larger process based on rational thought and experimentation that reduces the complexity of the real world into repeatable experiments that help refute a hypothesis. 20 Checkland, p. 26.
result, a particular input yields a corresponding output, and a slight change in the input yields a correspondingly slight change in the output. This relatively simple method is extremely effective, and works very well in disciplines such as physics where the interactions between elements are relatively minimal and the result is essentially an aggregation of the smaller elements. In fact, this approach has been effective enough to enable man to master most of the physical universe and considerably improved his lot in life.
However, the analytic approach, despite its effectiveness, contains a significant limitation that emerged as a new group of researchers and scientists tried to deal with problems emerging in the 20 th century. Namely, the assumptions underlying the analytical approach are not appropriate for dealing with complex, or non-linear, systems. 21 In complex systems, the interaction between various components cannot be discounted. In fact, understanding the interaction between components is essential for understanding the system. Additionally, the components only make sense in relation to the whole; therefore examining individual components in isolation is devoid of meaning. The final assumption for the analytical approach that does not apply to complex systems relates to the relationship between the input and output of the system. In complex systems, a slight change in the input does not yield a correspondingly slight change in the output.
In other words, the output is distinctly non-linear. As a result, the analytical approach does not deal effectively with social phenomena and other "real-world" problems. 22 Since warfare is a distinctly complex, non-linear phenomenon, any attempt to use analytical, reduction-based approaches to explain problems such as transitions is flawed.
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Systems thinking, or thinking in terms of "wholeness," developed over many years through several different avenues of research as scientists attempted to develop effective methods 21 Senge mentions that complexity falls into two categories -detail complexity and dynamic complexity. Detail complexity refers to the number of interactions and components in the system, while dynamic complexity refers to the relationship between the input and the output. One does not equate to the other. In this case, complexity is synonymous with dynamic complexity, i.e. non-linear systems.
22 Checkland, p. 31.
for dealing with complex systems. Although scientists involved in "hard" sciences began the dialogue concerning systems thinking and laid the foundation for the future development of the systems movement by providing definitions and articulating the fundamental concepts of systems thinking, social scientists quickly used these concepts to develop theories relating to the "soft"
sciences. 24 Unlike the analytical approach, systems thinking provided a way, to describe, predict, and potentially control the behavior of very complex systems by using a holistic approach that accounts for the complex interactions and characteristics of a particular system. 25 Instead of talking about causal links, they attempted to define problems and solutions in terms of interactions and other systems concepts. As a result, systems based techniques such as scheduling theory, decision theory, queuing theory, and organization theory emerged from these new concepts to handle complex problems.
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These theories are interdisciplinary and holistic in their approach, and are useful for solving, or at least gaining insights into, complex problems that are essentially non-linear and have strong interactions between components. For example, queuing theory, or optimization under conditions of crowding, applies to both the line at Burger King and the "line" of fire commands waiting in the queue at a battalion fire direction center. Decision theory, a mathematical theory concerned with choices among alternatives, applies to buying a car as much as choosing among different courses of action. 27 Systems theory is not a static body of thought, nor is it limited to a few rigid ideas. The theory grows and evolves over time as researchers, theorists, and practitioners add to the body of knowledge.
Social scientists began using systems approaches to human organizations soon after the beginning of the systems movement since it seemed to offer a new, and potentially revolutionary, way of examining the complex behavior of people. 28 Two of these approaches, Organizational
Theory and Organizational Development apply systems concepts to organizations to gain a better understanding of how complex organizations function. Although both of these approaches are very broad and have multiple definitions, Organizational Theory generally addresses the design and behavior of organizations while Organizational Development specifically focuses on planned change within an organization. 29 These inter-disciplinary approaches identified common principles that governed all organizations and addressed issues such as organizational structure and the evolution of organizations in a changing environment. Since these theories are interdisciplinary in nature, they provide a logical starting point for examining organizational issues within the military.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND CRITERIA
Since doctrine fails to provide a conceptual framework for examining transitions, and Organizational Development (OD) theory applies to planning change within all types of organizations, the proposed conceptual framework for transitions comes from Organizational Development literature. Although most of the OD literature is about planning change in the context of long-term change within an organization, it offers a logical launching point for looking
at relatively "short-term" transitions as well. As mentioned in the opening chapter, Beckhard and Harris present a model for the change process in any large organization. They believe that the 28 F.E. Kast an J.E. Roseweig, "The Modern View: A Systems Approach" in, Systems Behavior, 47. Also, see Beer, Organization Change and Development, A Systems View, 17. 29 Wendell L. French, et al., Organization Development, Theory, Practice, and Research , 6 . Dr. Beer defines OD as a process for diagnosing organizational problems by looking for incongruence between environment, structures, processes, and people. OD often takes a more "people" oriented approach to change process in large complex systems has several aspects -four of which, paraphrased slightly, form the conceptual framework for transitions used in this study. 30 structures. For this paper, the criteria incorporate the concepts but not the specific phrases used by Beckhard and Harris. Importantly, these criteria do not used a reduction-based approach; instead, they focus on systems concepts such as organizational structure and interaction between organizations. They attempt to establish whether the organizational structure and plan facilitate an effective transition. While not all inclusive, these criteria offer an effective way to examine and compare all types of transitions.
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organizational problems while Organizational Theory attempts to address many organizational problems using a more hard science approach. 30 Beckhard and Harris, 16. The other two aspects in the process are: evaluating the change effort, and stabilizing the new condition. Although important, these aspects imply long-term aspects such as changes to organizational culture that are outside the scope of this study.
31 Chapters 3-6 of Organizational Transitions: Managing Complex Change, focus on the specific strategies relating to planning, preparing, and executing the transition state.
32 Beckhard and Harris, 28. 33 Much of Beckhard and Harris's work is true to the OD concept of focusing on changing organizational culture, values, and norms. While this is certainly important for long-term change in organizations, its relevance to the framework used in this study is marginal. As a result, the criteria do not incorporate any of the aspects of transitions relating to organizational culture.
As stated before, the first component of the framework states that military organizations must have a clear and accurate picture of the present, or pre-change, situation. An unstated, and potentially catastrophic, assumption in many cases is that an organization understands the current situation. 34 In some ways, the slang expression, "You don't know what you don't know" is exactly on target. Businesses might not collect the data that indicates a rising problem until too late to avert a crisis. Military organizations face the same problem due to the uncertain environment in which they operate. Military organizations mitigate this problem through several organizational means. First, the command and control structure, equipment, and reporting procedures focus significant resources on understanding the status of friendly forces. Second, the military has intelligence organizations with their own collection assets that specifically focus on understanding the enemy. Consequently, the two criteria that support this component of the transition framework focus on these two elements. Specifically, are the organizational structures, equipment, and processes adequate to understand the status of friendly forces at a proper level to facilitate necessary decision-making and planning? And, are the organizational structures, equipment, and processes adequate to understand the status of enemy forces at a proper level to facilitate necessary decisio n-making and planning? Answers might reveal that an ineffective transition was partly the result of the organization not having a clear and accurate picture of the present situation due to flaws in organizational structure, equipment, or processes. Conceptual models are only useful if they help solve problems, and they are often only the first step in developing solutions to problems. The next step, in this case, is applying the model to some historical case studies to see how well the theoretical model accounts for reality.
40 FM 3-0, 6 -11. "Commanders maintain momentum by anticipating transitions and moving rapidly between types of operations," The first case study focuses on the transition from the air war to the ground war in Operation DESERT STORM. Although it occurs after the intervention in Panama, the two transitions appear to be independent in the sense that there is no evidence that any lessons concerning transitions from Panama influenced the planning of the transition in Operation DESERT STORM. As a result, the discussion focuses initially on Operation DESERT STORM to provide insights into the transition that occurs within the context of combat operations. As stated in the opening chapter, this transition is certainly different from the Panama case study in that it involves the transition between two services and both the pre-change state and the post-change state are combat in nature; however, the case study still provides an effective vehicle for examining transitions in terms of the conceptual framework. As a result, CENTCOM planners and leaders possessed an accurate understanding of Iraqi air and ground force disposition, composition, and intent during the air war.
OPERATION DESERT STORM
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In addition to understanding the status of enemy forces, CENTCOM leaders also possessed an excellent understanding of the status of friendly forces during the air war. This understanding was certainly a function of the command and control arrangements as well as the communication capabilities of the coalition force. And while none of these elements was perfect, they certainly enabled key leaders to understand the status of friendly and enemy forces during the air war with a remarkable degree of fidelity given the vast geographic area and number of forces involved.
50 Despite the problems identified in many accounts written after the war, the use of a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) at CENTCOM and the robust Tactical Air
Control System enabled the coalition to effectively plan, prepare, and execute an air war across the entire theater involving more than 2,700 coalition and U. 63 Swain, 106 . Planners for the ground war believed that VII Corps/Iraqi force ratio, the main effort in the ground offensive, appeared to be about 1.3:1. By combining the attrition from the air war with concentration of U.S. forces at key points on the battlefield, planners hoped to achieve a 11.5:1 ratio at the breach and a 2:1 ratio at the decisive point. 64 GWAPS, 49.
included many other, less tangible and quantifiable, factors, such as status of supplies and morale in Iraqi units to determine overall combat effectiveness. 65 While the BDA process in ODS contained significant shortcomings, it was a key component in the decision-making process.
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The CINCCENT used the status of Iraqi forces in the KTO as one of his primary conditions to determine when to launch the ground offensive.
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The status of friendly forces in theater was another critical condition relating to the transition from the air war to the ground offensive. 68 In the early months of Operation DESERT SHIELD, GEN Schwarzkopf clearly stated that he needed more forces to properly conduct any ground offensive against Iraqi forces. 69 As a result, President Bush authorized the US Army to send VII Corps from Germany to Saudi Arabia. 70 Consequently, the final date for launching the ground offensive depended considerably on Third Army's ability to get the appropriate forces to the Line of Departure (LD). 71 Not only did units have to deploy to the theater and prepare for combat operations, but the operational deception plan required the Third Army units attacking in the west to move into their final positions at the last possible moment in order to mislead the Iraqis about the main point of attack. As a result, considerable effort went into understanding the time needed to establish the appropriate sustainment architecture in the west, the time needed to move units into their attack positions, and the relationship to the air campaign. 72 Daily updates to the CINCCENT facilitated synchronization between these competing efforts. As mentioned above, CENTCOM identified the requirements it needed to prosecute the ground war and built a plan based on when those units would be ready to prosecute the ground offensive. This included mobilizing, training, and deploying a substantial portion of the National
Guard and Reserve as well as moving VII Corps forces stationed in Europe to Saudi Arabia.
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Another important, and seemingly obvious fact, is that U.S. ground forces possessed the requisite training and equipment for the ground war. 75 Finally, Third Army acted not only as the planning headquarter for the ground war, but also as a key executing headquarters. All of these factors, along with the ones stated earlier, contributed to successful transition to the ground war on 24
February, 1991.
CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING TRANSITIONS BETWEEN COMBAT PHASES
There are numerous reasons for the U.S. victory in Operation DESERT STORM -betterequipped soldiers, better-trained units, superior doctrine, and excellent coalition partners -to name just a few. 76 From an operational art perspective however, one might argue that the success of the ground campaign was also a result of CENTCOM's ability to seize and retain the initiative.
73 Ibid. 110. 74 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, page 387. From November 1990 to January 15, 1991, the number of U.S. forces in the theater effectively doubled. 75 Ibid. 357. Panama, February 1988 -January 1990 79 Ibid. 7 . This set of plans was renamed PRAYERBOOK in March, 1989.
These plans, designed to be executed sequentially, simultaneously, or independently, included non-combatant evacuation operations, combat operations, and stability and support operations.
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Tensions between the U.S. and Panama eased somewhat in the latter half of 1988, but they rose to crisis proportions in 1989 eventually leading to direct U.S. military intervention in
December. The events leading up to this intervention included everything from anti-U.S.
activities such as detaining school buses containing American children to actions against Panamanians. In May, Noriega nullified the results of a legitimate election, and his "supporters"
beat the "victorious" candidates as cameras and television crews from around the world watched. 81 In October, Noriega suppressed a coup attempt by one of his officers. 82 In December, tensions between the two countries accelerated to crisis proportions. On December 15, Noriega pressured the leading legislative body in Panama on December 15, to declare him "maximum leader and head of government" and declare that "a state of war existed in Panama" with the United States. 83 The following evening, PDF forces killed a Marine lieutenant at a checkpoint, and detained and harassed a Navy lieutenant and his wife. 84 As domestic pressure mounted to do something, removing Noriega by overt military action became an increasingly attractive option.
On December 17, 1989, President George H.W. Bush ordered U.S. forces to execute Operation JUST CAUSE. 85 On December 20, 1989, over 26,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines invaded Panama to remove Noriega from power, install a legitimate government, protect
American citizens, and protect the Panama Canal.
86 80 Ibid. 8. There were four plans in PRAYERBOOK. KLONDIKE KEY focused on noncombatant evacuation operations. POST TIME used forces stationed in Panama and forces from the U.S. to secure key facilities in the country such as the Panama Canal. BLUE SPOON used joint forces to conduct offensive operations to dismantle the PDF. BLIND LOGIC used the forces outlined in the other plans along with some Civil Affairs units to conduct stability and support operations. 81 Overall, the combat portion of the invasion went extremely well despite its complexity. 87 U.S. forces eliminated the PDF as a viable combat force within 24 hours. U.S. forces eventually captured Noriega and turned him over to U.S. legal authorities. The U.S. installed a new, democratically elected, government headed by Miguel Endara, the winner of the national election in May. Additionally, economic traffic through the Panama Canal suffered only minor disruptions. And this was at a relatively low cost in terms of U.S. casualties. Essentially, the combat operation was a resounding success. 88 However, the same adjectives did not apply to the post-combat portion of the plan.
Within hours of the beginning of the invasion, massive looting and general lawlessness began in the major cities and continued for several days. 89 The economic losses amounted to several billion dollars. 90 Not only did this have a significant economic impact on the country, but it also convinced many that the U.S. did not adequately plan the post-combat phase. Combat troops faced the unenviable task of attempting to find PDF members while trying to restore and maintain civil order. The organizations responsible for assisting in restoration found themselves disorganized, undermanned, and without a clear plan. 91 As a result, these organizations worked around the clock to restore government services across the country while trying to sort out command relationships. 92 It took essentially a month -from December 20, 1989 to January 17, 1990 -for SOUTHCOM to establish a formal organization specifically task organized for the restoration of Panama.
PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE TRANSITION
The transition framework offers an effective way to examine the problems encountered in the transition to post-combat operations in Panama. Fishel, 34. relates to SOUTHCOM and JTF-S understanding of the friendly and enemy situations during combat operations (the pre-change state). In this case, both SOUTHCOM and JTF-S benefited from the unusual conditions surrounding Operation JUST CAUSE. First, U.S. forces had been in Panama for many years due to the Panama Canal. As a result, U.S. forces lived on many bases throughout the country which provided not only convenient staging areas, but facilitated a very robust communications network that could span the most important parts of the country. In addition, planners knew virtually everything about the PDF -particularly their location and composition. Second, and despite the last few chaotic days leading up to the invasion, this crisis had been building for more than two previous years and encouraged the military to be prepared.
Staffs reviewed contingency plans. Units rehearsed missions. Important command and control elements, such as the JTF-S headquarters positioned themselves inside the country before the invasion. 93 As a result, SOUTHCOM had an excellent understanding of both the friendly and enemy situations during combat operations. SOUTHCOM forces also perceived the rapid breakdown of law and order within the country as the PDF ceased to exist. This understanding of the current situation enabled the JTF to quickly task units to meet the changing circumstances.
The second element of the transition framework pertains to the post-change state. In other words, did SOUTHCOM or JTF-S units have a clear concept for the future state (i.e. the postcombat phase)? As mentioned before, the post-combat phase really involved two periods. The first period, the "transition period," is the focus of this study and included the events from the time of the invasion until SOUTHCOM established the Military Support Group on 17 January.
The second period began with the establishment of the MSG and continued until the Panamanian government was capable of functioning independently. While forces rarely go into a conflict without a plan for combat actions, the same cannot be said for the post-combat phase. In this case, SOUTHCOM had a plan for post-combat operations. However, SOUTHCOM and JTF-S failed to integrate their two plans resulting in neither one planning adequately for the problems 93 Cole, 30. Both SOUTHCOM and JTF-S were stationed at Fort Clayton, Panama. encountered immediately after the invasion. The command dynamics, the organizational structure in SOUTHCOM and JTF-S, and the lack of doctrine all contributed to the problems encountered during the transition.
Both the SOUTHCOM commander, General Thurman, and the JTF-S commander, LTG Stiner, focused exclusively on the planning for combat operations with little regard for the postcombat planning. In fact, General Thurman stated that he "did not even spend five minutes on BLIND LOGIC during [his] briefing as the incoming CINC" and admits that it was the "last priority" on his agenda at the time. 94 LTG Stiner conceded afterwards that they dedicated "insufficient attention" to the post-combat planning. 95 In fact, while the JTF-S plan contained a "transition" phase and units were ordered to be prepared to execute civil military operations, the order also stated that units should make "every effort…to minimize commitments of U.S. assets to support CA operations."
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The organizational structure also contributed to the lack of planning for the transition Panama, it exacerbated the disconnect between combat and post-combat planning since the SOUTHCOM J5 staff was still the lead organization for planning the post-combat operations.
Additionally, concerns about operational security resulted in virtually all the planning being conducted within military circles at the expense of interagency input. 100 While this only had a marginal impact on the combat planning, it critically hampered the post-combat planning.
Finally, the post-combat planning suffered from a lack a mature doctrine concerning post-combat operations. 101 Since there was not a doctrinal model for restoration of a country such as security, governance, justice, and economic well-being, planners failed to anticipate some key problems. 102 The result was a plan that provided ample information about particular areas of Panama but did not present a coherent strategy for accomplishing the operational objectives.
The third element of the transition framework addresses conditions. As mentioned before, properly identified conditions, when effectively tied to decisions, allow organizations to transition more effectively by enabling them to anticipate events and make corresponding adjustments. In this case, SOUTHCOM, and JTF-S, needed to understand the conditions indicating the need to transition to post-combat operations. This transition involved changes in unit missions, boundaries, force capabilities, and task organization. Again, the specific conditions from the plan are not as important as understanding the role they played in the decision process. General
Thurman decided to execute BLING LOGIC the same day as the invasion when it became apparent that the looting in Panama would soon reach crisis proportions. initially be responsible for emergency service restoration as well as law and order in order to give 103 Schultz, 27. 104 Fishel, 13 . BLIND LOGIC, the precursor to PROMOTE LIBERTY, accounted for multiple conditions requiring US assistance in Panama. Not only was it designed to be executed independently, concurrently, or in immediately following combat operations, it was also designed to account for different levels of damage to the Panamanian infrastructure. Finally, it also accounted for variations in available U.S. forces. the follow-on organizations time to deploy, form, and gain situational understanding.
Unfortunately, the JTF-S planners essentially intended to immediately give all post-combat activities to the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) under United States Army South (USARSO) control.
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As mentioned above, both SOUTHCOM and JTF-S anticipated a "transition" period, but each organization believed the other was responsible for execution. Since JTF-S focused on combat operations, it did not appreciate and prepare for the rapid transition to post-combat operations at the tactical level. Many combat units had to police cities with little experience, expertise, or guidance. During the first week after the invasion, SOUTHCOM worked diligently to restore services, establish a functioning government, and coordinate the efforts of relief agencies while JTF-S tried to establish security in the country. Since a Presidential call-up for the reserve forces outlined in the original plan was not enacted, Civil Affairs (CA) officers only trickled into country, and even then for only a very limited period. SOUTHCOM worked to put a force structure in place with enough expertise to be effective, and this force, which eventually became the Military Support Group-Panama.
CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING TRANSITIONS TO POST-COMBAT PHASE
As the previous discussion shows, SOUTHCOM struggled with the transition to postcombat operations. From the beginning of the invasion until the establishment of the Military Support Group -Panama on 17 January, SOUTHCOM used a series of ad hoc solutions to deal with the post-conflict situation in Panama. While these solutions succeeded in restoring limited government services quickly, the problems with looting throughout Panama City, Colon, and other parts of the country reduced U.S. momentum and created a perception that the US did not adequately plan the post-combat phase. 106 Significantly, these difficulties occurred in a country where the U.S. had extensive experience and the population overwhelmingly supported U.S.
efforts.
This transition also highlighted some of the differences between various types of transitions, and some of the unique challenges associated with post-combat transitions. First, it demonstrated that initiative, in terms of setting the terms of action, in a post-combat setting involves both the security and reconstruction efforts within a country. Therefore, quickly integrating outside agencies in this effort is fundamental to success. Third, units must integrate combat and post-combat plans to delineate roles and responsibilities as well as ensure the appropriate capabilities are in place to immediately dominate the situation. Having SOUTHCOM plan the post-combat phase then attempt a "handover" of the plan to JTF-S at time of execution led to confusion in terms of roles, responsibilities, and assets.
As a result, SOUTHCOM and JTF-S had to pause in order to reorient assets and gain situational awareness to begin post-combat tasks. 
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS
The opening chapter began by highlighting the problems that U.S. forces, and the Army in particular, have transitioning to post-combat operations. It also highlighted the importance of transitions and offered a two-step strategy for exploring the problems and potential solutions associated with transitions. The first step involved developing a conceptual framework to examine transitions while the second step applied the conceptual model to two historical case studies. The resulting synthesis provides key insights into the nature of transitions, the capabilities and shortcomings of the conceptual model, the impact of military culture on transitions, the necessity of post-combat doctrine, and problems encountered in transitions and their potential solutions.
The historical case studies confirmed that all transitions are difficult and occur in highly complex environments. The case studies also highlighted some of the key differences between transitions that occur during combat operations versus transitions to post-combat operations.
First, unlike transitions that occur earlier in a campaign, the transition to the post-combat environment involves many other organizations outside the Department of Defense. Their involvement is essential for success, but greatly complicates the transition process. Unlike military units, these organizations do not have a common framework (i.e. doctrine) to guide their actions nor do they work in unison to reach a common objective. The transition to post-combat operations generally involves a shift away from the military as the primary instrument of national power, which leads to the second point. The transition to the post-combat environment involves a dramatic shift in mindset. The entire mentality of the force must move from a mindset that is generally destructive in nature to one that is constructive. Forces that were previously focused on destruction of an opponent must quickly shift mindset (and rules of engagement) and conduct joint checkpoints, etc. This reality is further complicated by the uncertainty often surrounding conflict termination. Third, the "enemy" often changes and becomes more nebulous in the post-combat phase. Instead of a well-defined enemy that has a known order of battle that can be targeted with conventional intelligence assets, the enemy in the post-conflict environment is often chaos itself, organized crime, looting, etc. As a result, units must change their mindset and techniques in order to retain the initiative. Finally, the cumulative effect of friction begins to affect unit performance. Transitions that occur earlier in a campaign benefit from the simple fact that they are closer to the "start conditions." Even with detailed post-conflict planning, it is extremely difficult to anticipate the actual conditions surrounding conflict termination due to the uncertainty of the battlefield and the cumulative effects of friction.
In terms of a conceptual model for transitions, the framework used throughout this workunderstanding the present state, understanding the future state, understanding the conditions, and managing the transition state -contains two particular strengths. First, it provides a general model for transitions that highlights the similarities between all types of transitions. This underscores the idea that all effective transitions, regardless of when they occur in a campaign, follow the same general principles. Recent difficulties in post-combat transitions result from a failure to follow these ideas. Second, it stresses the systems nature of transitions and highlights the futility of attributing ineffective transitions to a single cause or attempting to fix problems using a single solution.
The historical case studies illustrate the impact of military culture on post-combat transitions. As mentioned before, both General Thurman and LTG Stiner acknowledged the fact that they focused almost exclusively on combat operations at the expense of the post-conflict transition. If commanders and units believe that their raison d'etre lies exclusively in the realm of combat operations, they will fail to dedicate sufficient effort to the transition from combat to postcombat operations. The result is a loss of operational and strategic momentum that potentially leads to a prolonged post-combat phase. Based on the recent example of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, this mentality still dominates military thinking despite doctrine's emphasis on achieving the desired end state.
The historical case studies also illustrate the important role of doctrine, and indicate that U.S. forces will continue to have difficulty transitioning to post-combat operations as long as there is not a valid doctrinal framework for post-combat operations to anchor planning. Doctrine must go beyond the current construct of stressing the importance of post-combat operations and transitions; it must provide a valid framework to guide planning. 107 This includes operations that immediately follow combat as well as integration of these operations into the overall concept of prosecuting a campaign. This has particular relevance in the current environment where U.S.
forces possess the capability to defeat enemy forces with unparalleled rapidity. Doctrine must achieve the proper balance in order to facilitate achieving the overall objectives for the nation.
The case studies emphasize one key concept -effective transitions result from having the right capability in the right place at the right time that can immediately dominate the situation.
Situational understanding plays a central role in dominating the situation. Consequently, the longer it takes a force to reorient assets and gain situational understandin g the more difficult the transition. Comparing the results from the case studies offers several ways to mitigate these challenges during the transition to post-combat operations.
First, commanders must adequately resource the planning and preparation efforts for the post-change state in order for the transition to the post-change state to go well. In other words, operational level commands must resist the temptation to focus exclusively on the present, or prechange state. The operational level headquarters cannot abdicate its responsibility for planning the future phase, and it must be willing to allocate sufficient resources in terms of organizations and equipment to properly plan and prepare for the future phase despite the more pressing demands of the current phase. This maintains momentum by ensuring that the organization is prepared to immediately execute the future phase when needed.
While the specific organizational solutions depend on the situation, the case studies show that a robust organization, in terms of both headquarters and actual forces, must plan and execute the transition. It must be capable of identifying key decision points associated with execution of the phase, identifying the corresponding intelligence requirements for those decisions, and have the capability to collect the necessary intelligence. In the case of Operation DESERT STORM, Third Army possessed sufficient assets, resources, and expertise to plan and prepare for the ground war. This included Third Army developing its own intelligence requirements and focusing intelligence assets on those requirements in order to have immediate situational understanding when the ground offensive began. As a result, CENTCOM did not have to pause when it was time to transition to the ground war while Third Army gained situational understanding.
Following these ideas reduce delays caused by a force having to pause in order to reorient assets and gain situational awareness when transitioning to a new phase.
Second, the post-change state planning must be thoroughly integrated with pre-change state planning. This prevents gaps in capability and reduces confusion in command relationships and missions. Identifying the conditions associated with a transition serve as an effective integrating mechanism as well. These conditions should be explicitly identified, and they should focus on friendly forces as well as enemy forces. The higher-level headquarters is vital to this process. In Operation DESERT STORM, CENTCOM planners articulated particular conditions for the transition from one phase to the next, incorporated those in the plan, and tracked their status.
Third, the appropriate forces for the post-change phase, in terms of capabilities and size, must be in place to immediately begin operations in order to reduce the time and impact of the transition period. The specific solution depends on the situation, but it must be addressed in the planning. In order to reduce the length of the transition period, plans must account for the time needed to identify conditions, the time needed to make decisions, and the time needed to mobilize, train, deploy, or reorganize the force. 108 In Operation DESERT STORM, the ground forces were trained and ready to execute when the ground offensive began. In Operation JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY, many essential capabilities for the post-combat phase were not in place to immediately impact the situation
Finally, as this study shows, transitions play an important role in maintaining operational and strategic momentum. Why does the Army seem to struggle with the transition to post-combat operations? The answer appears to be multi-faceted. The easy answer is that ineffective transitions result from an organization failing to understand the present, understand the future, understand the conditions surrounding the transition, or effectively manage the transition period.
The more difficult answers relate to why these failures happen and how to fix them. Doctrine and culture offer two potential solutions, but both will take time to change. In the meantime, professional discussion needs to focus on this "dynamic yet unique state of affairs" in order to help commanders and planners better balance the needs of the future with the pressing demands of today.
108 Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, ed. Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations offers an in-depth analysis of establishing a force with the responsibility to "fill the gap" between combat operations and the nation-building effort.
